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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT        COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
In the Matter of the Application of
LEON GREATHOUSE,#08-A-2920,
                           Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #44-1-2016-0159.03
INDEX #147334
           -against-                                                          
NEW YORK STATE BOARD 
OF PAROLE,
      Respondent.      
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition (denominated Complaint) of Leon Greathouse, verified on
March 17, 2016 and filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on March 24, 2016.  
Petitioner, who is an inmate at the Gouverneur  Correctional Facility, is challenging the May
2015 determination denying him discretionary parole release and directing that he be held
for an additional 24 months.  The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on March 28, 2016
and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return verified on May 20, 2016,
including confidential Exhibits B, C and D.  The Court has also received and reviewed the
petitioner’s reply thereto.
While on lifetime parole for an indeterminate sentence of incarceration for three (3)
years to life, the petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender following his plea of
guilt to one count of Attempted Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. 
The petitioner was sentenced on May 23, 2008 to a determinate term of incarceration of
seven (7) years with three (3) years post-release supervision.  The petitioner appeared for the
second time before the Parole Board on May 20, 2015.   Following that appearance, Petitioner
was denied discretionary parole release and it was directed that he be held for an additional
24 months.  The parole denial determination reads as follows:
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“FOLLOWING CAREFUL REVIEW AND DELIBERATION OF YOUR
RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THIS PANEL CONCLUDES THAT
DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED DUE TO
CONCERN FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.  THE FOLLOWING
FACTORS WERE PROPERLY WEIGHED AND CONSIDERED:
YOUR INSTANT OFFENSE IN SARATOGA COUNTY IN SEPTEMBER
2008, INVOLVED ATT. CSCS 3RD. 
YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY INDICATES YOU WERE ON PAROLE AT
THE TIME ABOUT THIRTY (30) MONTHS FROM A 2002 CPCS 3RD.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMMING INDICATES PROGRESS
AND ACHIEVEMENT WHICH IS NOTED.
YOUR DISCIPLINARY RECORD REFLECTS ONE (1) TIER 2, AND
ONE (1) TIER 3 REPORTS.  YOU HAVE SERVED SHU TIME.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY, REHABILITATION
EFFORTS, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY RE-ENTRY.
YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE, AT THIS TIME, WOULD THUS
NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY AT LARGE, AND
WOULD TEND TO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INSTANT
OFFENSE, AND UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.”  Resp. Ex. F.
An appeal of the parole board’s determination was filed on behalf of the petitioner on
October 26, 2015.  Thereafter, the Board of Parole Appeals Unit upheld the determination on
December 1, 2015.
Petitioner challenges the denial of parole release alleging that the parole board failed
to properly consider all of the statutory factors, specifically that the petitioner received his
certificate of earned eligibility pursuant to Correction Law §805.  Petitioner faults the parole
board for failing to appreciate the positive steps he has made while incarcerated and further
failed to consider the petitioner’s plans upon release.1  Petitioner further alleges that the
1  The Court notes that in the petition, the petitioner alleges that “his release plans include living with
his father, or a sister, in Charleston, South Carolina.” Petition, ¶54.  However, during the parole interview, the
petitioner advised that he would reside in the Bronx with the mother of his daughter, Ms. Alston. Resp. Ex.E,
p.6.
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parole board erroneously considered his instant offense, Attempted Criminal Sale of a
Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, which had already been considered at the initial
parole hearing.  Petitioner asserts that the pursuant to 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b), the parole
board was foreclosed from considering factors previously considered at the initial parole
board appearance and utilizing the same information, particularly the details of the instant
offense, is tantamount to resentencing.  Similarly, the petitioner asserts that the parole board
afforded weight to an arrest in 2000 for a charge of Murder that has not been indicted and
to which the petitioner vehemently denies involvement.  The petitioner alleges that there are
compelling reasons to grant him parole and the parole board’s denial of same is arbitrary and
capricious.  Furthermore, petitioner alleges the 24 month hold is excessive.
Respondent argues that the petitioner should be dismissed in its entirety insofar as
the parole board is afforded great discretion in determining parole release provided that the
board considers the relevant factors as described in Executive Law §259-i(c)(A).  Respondent
argues that there is no requirement that the parole board give equal weight to each factor nor
does an inmate’s exemplary institutional record compel parole release.  Respondent asserts
that the petitioner’s reliance upon 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b) is misplaced as the language
petitioner cited has been modified.  Respondent further asserts that the denial of parole is not
akin to double jeopardy and there is no “right” to discretionary parole release.
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §§38-f
and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but
after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall
require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including
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program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff
and inmates; ... (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services available to the
inmate; ... (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the
type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating
factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior
criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to
any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5)) unless there had been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470; Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268;
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614.  Unless the
Petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary,” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521
and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
To the extent Petitioner purports to rely on King v. New York State Division of
Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d 788, the Court finds such reliance to be misplaced. 
In King, the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the Parole
Board improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with respect
to convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “to consider and fairly weigh
all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant under
the statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative achievements
and would appear to strongly militate in factor of granting parole.”  Id. at 433.  The
appellate-level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion referenced
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by the Board in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the crime
underlying Mr. King’s incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police office during
the robbery of a fast food restaurant).  According to the Appellate Division, First
Department, “[s]ince ... the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se
should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances
beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.” Id. at  433.
This Court (Supreme Court, Saint Lawrence County) first notes that Mr. King had
no prior contacts with the law. Id. at 426.  Petitioner, on the other hand, previously
served three (3) years of incarceration with DOCCS for Criminal Possession of a
Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and, in fact, committed in the instant offense
while on parole release.  In addition, although the King court did not reference Mr.
King’s disciplinary record, it characterized his overall prison record as “exemplary.”  Id.
at 425.  The parole denial determination in King, as quoted by the Appellate Division,
First Department, described Mr. King’s institutional adjustment as “excellent.”  Id. at
430.  In the case at bar, however, Petitioner’s prison disciplinary record, as alluded to in
the May 2015 parole denial determination, includes one Tier II infraction and one Tier
III infraction which resulted in a disposition of SHU.  It is clear, therefore, that the May
2015 parole denial determination was not based exclusively on the nature of the crimes
underlying Petitioner’s incarceration but, rather, was also based on his record of prior
drug related felony offenses and his less than stellar prison disciplinary record despite
the short period of time since his initial appearance before the parole board.
In any event, in July of 2014, the Appellate Division, Third Department - whose
precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that the “aggravating
circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does not
represent the state of the law in the Third Department.  See, Hamilton v. New York
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State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268.  In Hamilton, it was noted that the Third
Department “has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the
[Parole] Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259-
i(2)(c)(A)] it is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’
(Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903
(20144) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]’”. Id. at 1271 (other citations
omitted).  After favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and
2014, the Hamilton court ended the string of cites as follows: “... but see Matter of King
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83
NY2d 788[2](1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that
the Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of
the crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as
not outweighing the seriousness of the crime.”  119 AD3d at 1272.
Petitioner’s above arguments notwithstanding, a Parole Board need not assign equal
weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary
parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its
written decision.  See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197; see also Valentino v Evans, 92
AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152.  As noted by
the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial
determination
2 The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “one of the [Parole] Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.  Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.”   83 NY2d 788, 791.  The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect of
the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination must
be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.
Page 6 of  9
[* 6]
 “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant
factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and
rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts
in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process,
given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each
factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior
(internal citations omitted).”  Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole,
68 AD3d 1295, 1296.
The petitioner puts great emphasis on the fact that he had received a certificate of
earned eligibility pursuant to Correction Law §805 for which he asserts the parole board
failed to consider.  
Correction Law §805 reads, in pertinent part:
“...Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an inmate who is serving a
sentence with a minimum term of not more than eight years and who has
been issued a certificate of earned eligibility, shall be granted parole release
at the expiration of his minimum term or as authorized by subdivision four
of section eight hundred sixty-seven of this chapter unless the board of
parole determines that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate
is released, he will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and
that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. Any action by
the commissioner pursuant to this section shall be deemed a judicial function
and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law (emphasis added).”
Earned eligibility does not preclude review of all the relevant factors as described in
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A) and in fact, the parole board is required “after considering the
documents and information set forth in paragraphs (a)(1)-(12) of [ §8002.3], [to] apply the
standard set forth in section 8002.1(b).” 9 NYCRR §8002.3(c).  The parole board clearly
found that the exception to earned eligibility release was warranted.
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report and transcript of Petitioner’s
May 20, 2015 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information with
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respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including Petitioner’s educational and
therapeutic programming records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument,
sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and his future plans regarding release, as well as
information with respect to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration
and prior criminal record.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to
suggest that the Parole Board denied the Petitioner an opportunity to answer questions or
provide insight into how and why he believed that he would be a good candidate for release. 
Indeed, the Petitioner was forthright when he indicated that he understood that his use of
narcotics in the past led to his criminal behavior and he wanted to seek employment
training in a field that would provide gainful employment. 
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.  See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of the discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s
incarceration and his prior criminal record (including that the instant offense occurred
while he was on parole for a previous similar crime).  See Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320
and Confoy v. New York State Division of Parole, 173 AD2d 1014.
The Petitioner asserts that the Parole Board’s determination of a 24 month hold
was excessive insofar as the Petitioner has received his certificate for earned eligibility
and he should have only received six or twelve months hold.  In light of the foregoing
factors discussed relative to the Petitioner’s previous criminal history, including the
instant offense occurring while he was on parole release for a previous felony sentence,
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the Board’s imposition of a 24 month hold is not unduly excessive.  See Shark v. New
York State Division of Parole, 110 AD3d 1134, 1135, lv dismissed 23 NY3d 933; see also
Smith v. New York State Division of Parole, 81 AD3d 1026.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: August 15, 2016
Indian Lake, New York ___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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